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Misanthropy without Humanity 
 
Tom Tyler 
 
Misanthropy is the dislike or hatred of humanity as a whole.  The term derives from 
the Greek “μ“?“σ“ος (hatred) and “?“ν“c“ρ“t“π“ο“ςȱǻǼǯȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ
in literature and elsewhere, have frequently attributed it to one or both of two 
motivations.  On the one hand, the misanthrope is often depicted as being ruled by 
passion, their intense, emotional abhorrence of humanity the result of personal 
affronts or misfortunes.  Thus, ȱȱȱȂs Timon of Athens, 
overcome with resentment and loathing for the society that has abused his 
generosity and good will, retreats into the wilderness, wishing only ill on his fellows; 
in the closing lines of the play, his epitaph records the hope that ȃa plague consume 
you, wicked caitiffs left!Ȅ (Shakespeare 1959, V.4.71; a caitiff is a wretched, despicable 
individual).  On the other hand, the misanthropist will be guided by unbending 
principle, their reasoned disdain deriving from a high-minded moral code.  In 
¸Ȃs The Misanthrope, AlcesteȂs uncompromising insistence on honesty and 
plain-speaking, and his refusal to indulge the dissembling fops and fools around 
him, similarly lead to self-imposed exile: ȃFinding on every hand base flattery, / 
Injustice, fraud, self-interest, treachery. ... / ǰȱȂȱȱǲȱȱȱ ȱȱ
base, / I mean to break with the whole human raceȄ (Molière 1989, I.1).  Timon is a 
tragic hero, Alceste comic, but they share the character flaw of excess: where Timon 
is over generous, Alceste is too honest.  Both are represented as extreme, even 
pathological, in their ways, and misanthropy is cast as a misguided consequence or 
symptom of intemperate inclinations. 
 
In 2012, a video game was released which offers players the opportunity actively to 
pursue TiȂs curse on humanity.  Plague Inc., developed by Ndemic Creations for 
mobile devices, casts you as a pathogen: you can select from bacterium, virus, 
parasite, and a variety of other microorganisms.  Played out over a world map, you 
must select a country in which to infect patient zero, and then evolve over time by 
manipulating traits such as your rate and mode of transmission (in arid or humid 
countries, for instance, or by means of carriers such as birds, insects, rodents and 
livestock), your manifesting symptoms (coughing and sneezing, seizures, cysts and 
necrosis, amongst many others), and your resistance to environmental and 
therapeutic threats (extreme climates, antibiotics, et al.).  Your objective, which it 
seems hard to describe as anything other than misanthropic, is to spread across the 
world and obliterate the human species, and your progress is recorded by means of 
ongoing tallies of those you have managed to infect and kill.  As time goes on, you 
can take advantage of opportunities to increase contagion (mass bird migrations, or 
Olympic gatherings), but, once humans have become aware of you, must also 
contend with their attempts at containment (closed borders, or animal culls), and 
their increasingly vigorous research for a cure.  Timing is crucial: evolve too fast, and 
you will kill off your hosts before you can infect the whole world; too slow, and they 
will have time to develop a cure.  The game was subsequently expanded to include 
scenarios that allow you to play as specific diseases such as the Black Death, 
smallpox and swine flu, or in alternative worlds beset by increased global warming, 
financial crises or xenophobia, as well as with entirely fictional plague types such as 
the Neurax worm, whȱȱȱȱȂ minds, and the Necroa virus, which 
turns the infected into zombies. 
 
In 2014, Plague Inc. was further expanded with a new disease to tie-in with the 
rebooted Planet of the Apes film series.  Rise of the Planet of the Apes (Wyatt 2011) tells 
the story of the development of an experimental viral-based drug which repairs and 
augments cognitive ability but, though stable in chimpanzees and other apes, proves 
fatal to humans.  Events lead to the escape both of a group of enhanced apes and of 
the deadly virus, anȱȱȂs closing scenes show the apes retreating into a forest 
refuge and the infection spreading rapidly around the world.  With Plague Inc.'s 
ȁSimian FluȂ expansion, which was released to coincide with the Dawn of the Planet of 
the Apes film sequel (Reeves 2014), you control a pathogen once again, but this time 
there are two strains.  You must develop both the human variant, which is 
debilitating in the usual ways, but also the ape form, which enhances its hosts: the 
virus can boost communication, social cohesion, understanding of human behaviour, 
and more.  You also gain a degree of direct control over the apes themselves, and are 
able to place colonies, move groups around the world, and rescue captive apes from 
research labs.  In effect, you play both apes and virus, pursuing independent but 
complementary objectives: escape from, and destruction of, humanity. 
 
Fig x.  Plague Inc. (Ndemic Creations, 2012) 
 
So how is the misanthropy of Plague Inc. and its Simian Flu expansion represented?  
Are players encouraged to recoil from humanity as a matter of passion or principle, 
or something else again?  In fact, no motivation for annihilating the human species is 
posited during the course of the game, and players are engaged to pursue their 
gruesome goal without emotional investment or underpinning rationale.  The end of 
humanity is simply tȱȂȱtrategic objective, and a quality of cool, abstract 
calculation pervades the gameplay.  ȱȂȱȱconsist in the main of the 
simplified satellite image of the world, displaying only the most basic natural 
topography dotted with icons for harbours and airports, and a series of stylised 
diagrams ȱȱȂȱvarious traits; altogether absent are explicit 
representations of the intense misery and suffering and the devastating social 
collapse that would be the reality of the pandemics the game models.  Indications of 
ȱȂȱȱre provided only in the form of graphs and tables recording the 
rate of infection or the number of countries affected, and by means of terse, 
minimally informative news headlines and announcements.  Further, the game does 
not in any way condemn or denounce the course that you are required to pursue.  
Unlike the characterisations of the misanthropes Timon and Alceste, there is no sense 
here that ill-wishes toward humanity are improper or misguided, or symptomatic of 
some unhealthy aberration.  In Plague Inc., misanthropy is pathological only in the 
most literal sense. 
 
The term pathology ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȃdiseases and abnormal anatomical and 
physiological conditionsǰȄȱȱȱȱcollective features and behaviour of such a 
condition ǻȁ¢ǰȱǯȂȱŘŖŗŚǼ.  By colloquial extension, someone who is pathological 
 ȱ¡ȱȃa quality or trait to a degree considered extreme or psychologically 
unhealthyȄ ǻȁǰȱǯȱȱǯȂȱŘŖŗřǼ, as did Timon and Alceste.  The 
philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem points out, however, that establishing 
what counts as normal or pathological, and the relationship between these two 
states, is by no means a straightforward matter (Canguilhem 1989).  What is normal 
cannot simply be what is most common, as is often supposed: an anomalous 
individual can be perfectly healthy and will, in effect, constitute its own norm, even 
ȱȱȂȱȱsome statistical average (Canguilhem 1989, 144; Lechte 1994, 15).  
Further, any particular state of an organism, even a pathological state, will be 
characterised by typical patterns of behaviour that are appropriate for an organism 
in that state, i.e. it will be governed by norms (Gutting 1989, 47).  In fact, Canguilhem 
argues, ȃThere is no objective pathology.  Structures or behaviors can be objectively 
described but they cannot be called ȁpathologicalȂ on the strength of some purely 
ȱȄȱ(Canguilhem 1989, 226).  Ascertaining what is normal or 
pathological is not a matter of applying some absolute, universal rule.  Rather, the 
whole question of what is normal or pathological is highly situated, and depends on 
the nature of the specific organism and its environment.  In particular, it depends on 
that Ȃȱd experience.  A living creature will value certain states over 
others: it will value those that enhance it and allow it to flourish over those that 
impede or work to eliminate it (Canguilhem 1989, 126Ȯ127; Gutting 1989, 47).  
ȃing beȱȱȱȱȄȱ(Canguilhem 1989, 222), and resolving what 
is to be considered normal or pathological will always be a matter of such preference 
and evaluation.  Canguilhem reminds us, in fact, that it is from the Latin valere, 
which means to be in good health, that the term value derives (Canguilhem 1989, 
201).  A healthy state, Canguilhem ultimately argues, is not to be equated with some 
abstract, generalised notion of what is normal, but is one in which an organism, be it 
bird, fox or amoeba, is capable of ȱȱȂȱǰȱ
accidents and infractions.  It is one in which a creature is able to adapt and adjust to 
new situations and circumstances, which is to say one in which it is able to function 
according to new norms, indeed to institute new norms (Canguilhem 1989, 196Ȯ199; 
Gutting 1989, 47Ȯ48). 
 
It seems fair to say that Timon and Alceste manifest extreme qualities that are 
unhealthy to them, and constitute, even according to Ȃȱcareful analysis, 
a form of pathology.  Neither is able to tolerate the inconstancies, accidents and 
infractions with which they are beset, and both are compelled to withdraw from 
human society altogether.  Timon, in fact, entirely fails to adapt to his new 
circumstances, with fatal consequences.  What makes Timon and Alceste ill is 
¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱinflated expectations, to comply with the 
standards they believe should hold for all civilized society.  As such, their frustration 
and fury is directed toward those they recognise and acknowledge as their own kind: 
ȃ ȱȱȦȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȄȱ¢ȱe (Molière 1989, V.7), and 
ȃ
 semblable, yea himself, Timon disdainsȄȱ(Shakespeare 1959, IV.3.22).  Their 
hatred is, in truth, a form of self-hatred.  And it is in this way that these conventional 
representations of misanthropy would have us grant that hatred of humanity is 
pathological: what could possibly be more unhealthy than to hate yourself?  It is this 
self-defeating impulse that is ultimately the deviation or abnormality that determines 
the archetypal Ȃȱ ǯ  But this characterisation of misanthropy as a 
pathological state is itself, of course, an evaluation, a particular, prejudicial depiction 
of the misanthrope and the object of their disaffection.  ȱȱȱȂ  
self-love and their love of humanity as both equivalent and necessary, it casts 
humanity itself as the norm.  It is, in short, an anthropocentric portrayal of 
misanthropy, or, better, what we might call an anthroponormative portrayal.  We can 
see this most clearly if we look at the circumstances in which the term misanthropy is 
actually employed, and those in which it is not. 
 
Though dictionary definitions ȱȃ¢ǰȄȱ perhaps too closely on 
etymology, tell us simply that it is the hatred of humanity ǻȁ¢ǰȱǯȂȱŘŖŗřǼ, 
the word has in fact been used only of humans who express this loathing.  Agent 
Ȃs (Hugo Weaving) damning diatribe in The Matrix (Wachowski sibblings 
1999), fuelled by a visceral revulsion from the human form that he has been required 
to adopt, spells out the reasons foȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ¢Ǳȱunlike all other 
mammals, humans do not regulate their interactions with their environment, but 
instead multiply indefinitely until they have consumed everything around them, and 
then spread to another area.  Human beings, Smith says, are a virus or disease: ȃYou 
are a plague, and we are the cureȄ (Wachowski sibblings 1999, pt. 1.30:55Ȯ1.31:59).  
But despite the evident passion and principle, it would be inappropriate to describe 
Agent Smith as a misanthrope.  He is a machine, and there is no element of self-
loathing in his detestation.  Similarly, in Plague Inc. neither the varied diseases 
working to wipe out humanity, nor the enhanced apes who shun it, can rightly be 
called misanthropic, given that these are inhuman agents and do not hate 
themselves. 
 
Following Canguilhem, what makes viruses, parasites, funguses, bacteria and other 
microorganisms pathological is the fact that they impact on the lived experience of a 
particular human individual.  The coughs and sneezes, seizures and skin lesions, 
abscesses and organ failures caused by a plague will impede, incapacitate and 
ultimately eliminate those individuals.  A plague is pathological because it is 
evaluated as such from a particular perspective, a human perspective.  But Agent 
Smith, the machine, has an altogether different assessment of what constitutes a 
plague, and the so-called Simian Flu actually enhances the apes it infects.  Plague Inc., 
with its cool, calculated gameplay, motivated by neither passion nor principle, posits 
alternatives to the human perspective, and institutes inhuman norms.  You play not 
as humanity, struggling to remain healthy in the face of a changeable, hostile 
environment, but as the plague itself, or as the apes, constantly evolving and 
transforming yourself to outwit and overcome your human opponent.  For its 
duration, the game requires you, in short, to invest in the values, in the evaluations 
and preferences, of a virus or parasite or ape.  As a consequence, despite first 
appearances, Plague Inc. is not, properly speaking, misanthropic, at least as that term 
has traditionally been used.  Rather, it provides for non-anthropocentric modes of 
opposing humanity, rejecting the pathologisation of the misanthrope and 
normalisation of the human.  It intimates, in fact, that anthroponormative self-
identification is itself a form of investment and valuation rather than a necessary and 
inevitable species-identity, and it entertains the possibility of a misanthropy without 
humanity. 
 
 
Thanks 
Steve Baker, Gary Gutting, Jane Harris, Sarah Irons, Kurt Lampe, Robert McKay, 
Richard Tyler. 
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